Introduction
In the last two decades, there have been increasing numbers of attempts to allow voting via the Internet. Governments have experimented with Internet voting (i-voting) 1 both in local and national elections (Alvarez, Hall, and Trechsel 2009; Goodman, Pammett, and DeBardeleben 2010; Mendez 2013) . Parties have introduced i-voting to select candidates and conduct internal referendums (Done 2002; Lanzone and Rombi 2014) . In a similar vein, a variety of participatory governance processes have introduced i-voting to increase citizen engagement, ranging from participatory budgeting in Brazil to referenda in Switzerland (Peixoto 2009; Sampaio, Maia, and Marques 2011; Nitzsche, Pistoia, and Elsäßer 2012; Stortone and De Cindio 2014; Mendez 2013) .
While the number of examples of Internet voting is steadily increasing and the literature on the subject is burgeoning, the empirical evidence on the effects of i-voting is still limited and major questions remain open (Carter and Bélanger 2012; Pammett and Goodman 2013) . Is i-voting used mostly by those who are already politically active and interested? Are some citizens only willing to vote via the Internet? If so, what are the socio-economic characteristics of this group? What are the effects of Internet voting on turnout, inclusiveness and diversity? Does introducing i-voting distract people from traditional forms of participation?
The objective of this paper is to contribute to answering these questions by providing evidence on the effects of Internet voting on participation. But apart from its empirical character, this contribution is also relevant for two other reasons. First, it assesses the effect of i-voting in an understudied field of i-voting, that is, in participatory governance (i.e. non-electoral) processes. Second, while the majority of i-voting studies have focused on the US and Europe, this study looks at an experience from a middleincome country, Brazil.
We present the results of a unique survey of over 22,000 Internet voters from the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul during a referendum on state-level spending priorities. 2 This referendum is part of a large multi-channel democratic innovation that simultaneously combines both online and offline voting. This process, entitled "State System for Citizen Participation in the Budget Process" 3 , allows citizens to influence the formulation of projects for the allocation of public spending and to select which of the projects will be implemented via a referendum. It is a form of participatory budgeting (PB) applied at the state level (henceforth State PB). 4 Here we analyze the last stage of the State PB, that is, the vote in the final referendum, during which the population prioritizes the projects to be funded.
More specifically, we investigate the traits and attitudes of those that cast their ballot via the Internet using a post-vote survey. The survey was implemented as an online exit poll at the time of the vote in early July 2012 and consists of 27 questions. 5 The questions aimed to identify the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, their media and ICT usage habits, as well as their previous level of engagement with politics and civil society (see appendix 3). The key question we asked the participants is whether they would have voted traditionally if there has been no opportunity to vote online. This question identifies the subset of participants that self-identify as online-only voters.
The Rio Grande do Sul e-survey allows us to investigate three key research questions:
1) Does the possibility of online voting primarily attract online-only voters (mobilization hypothesis)? Or is i-voting mostly used by traditional voters for convenience (substitution hypothesis)? 2) What is the socio-economic profile of those that self-identify as online-only voters? More specifically, are they predominantly young, educated, rich, males that are familiar with the Internetas we would expect from the literature on digital divide (reinforcement hypothesis)? Or are they predominantly marginalized individuals with low income and education (empowerment hypothesis)? 3) What is the level of pre-existing engagement of these voters? Are online-only voters already engaged in the public sphere, or does the new venue of participation attract previously disengaged portions of society (engagement hypothesis)?
Anticipating the key results of the analysis, our study shows that i-voting increases participation among previously non-engaged strata of the population, potentially increasing turnout and promoting the inclusiveness of the process as a whole (mobilization and engagement hypothesis). However, these new participants -the online-only not-engaged voters -are likely to be socio-economically more privileged. The latter result rejects the empowerment hypothesis and identifies a crucial challenge for the design of multi-channel democratic innovations. Introducing digital channels of participation might significantly strengthen the voice of privileged groups, and thus might overall reduce the voice of marginalized groups. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the key research questions of the literature on i-voting and identifies testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the introduction of ivoting in Brazilian participatory engagement processes and introduces the State PB. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses these findings in the light of the literatures of convenience voting, participatory governance and collective intelligence; concluding with implications for future practice and research.
Extant Theory
While a detailed overview of the vast literature on the variety of Internet voting mechanisms and their impact is beyond the scope of this paper, for our purposes it is important to highlight the two key issues of turnout and inclusiveness. The debate on the benefits of remote voting in increasing voter turnout started with postal voting (Moreton Jr 1985; Kousser and Mullin 2007; Stein and Vonnahme 2011; Mann and Mayhew 2012) and has seen a series of iterations that have followed the evolution of information and communication technologies (Trechsel et al. 2007; Alvarez, Hall, and Trechsel 2009; Bochsler 2010; Carter and Bélanger 2012) . The rational choice approach, assuming that the act of voting implies both costs and benefits 6 offers a framework to support any form of convenience voting and thus can be used to support the adoption of internet voting (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Aldrich 1993) . The relationship between the convenience of voting and participation is established in the following manner: holding all other factors constant, the probability of participation will be negatively correlated with the costs of participation. Because of this relationship and the growing access to the Internet in both developed and developing countries, i-voting scholars have often highlighted the Internet's potential to increase turnout by reducing its costs (Alvarez and Hall 2004; Trechsel et al. 2007; Carter and Bélanger 2012) .
Another approach that is often used to explain why people vote, even if they have almost no chance to affect the outcomes, is rooted in various socialization theories. According to socialization scholars participation is mostly learned. Early experiences are particularly important in shaping individuals' level of political participation (Dalton, 2008; Hooghe, 2004; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995) . Using the lens of socialization theory the adoption of i-voting should be negatively correlated with age and familiarity with new technologies.
The concept of inclusiveness in voting processes refers to the diversity of participants and the extent to which groups traditionally excluded from a process may be effectively included . In this respect, optimistic views support a 'empowerment hypothesis', which states that the introduction of online modes of participation will increase the participation of citizens previously marginalized in traditional participatory processes (Norris 2001) . While there is significant reason to believe that Internet voting has the potential to boost turnout and inclusiveness, the empirical literature finds mixed results. The effects of i-voting appear to be elusive, with some cases presenting minor results and others suggesting no effect whatsoever (Vassil and Weber 2011; Pammett and Goodman 2013). 7 In fact, at odds with the empowerment thesis, much of the digital divide literature suggests that unequal access to the Internet will disproportionately increase the representation of economically advantaged groups who are already politically active (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2010; Bélanger and Carter 2011; Brandtzaeg, Heim, and Karahasanović 2011; Alvarez and Nagler 2000) . Often referred to as the 'reinforcement hypothesis', such studies posit that people with the resources and motivation to participate, who are usually the better off, will be further empowered by the introduction of online modes of participation (Norris 2001; Davis 1998) .
It is a well-established fact that Internet access is correlated with income and education (Hilbert 2010) . While initial analyses of the digital divide focused on Internet penetration (Compaine 2001) , modern investigations in developed countries where Internet penetration has reached high percentages of the population center on citizens' capacity to effectively use the Internet (Hsieh, Rai, and Keil 2008; Brandtzaeg, Heim, and Karahasanović 2011; Sarkar et al. 2011) . Overall, the trajectory of this literature has evolved from explanations based on income and education, to more complex explanations that consider a variety of factors that affect the usage of ICT technologies, such as cognitive and social skills (Deursen, Helsper, and Eynon 2014; Ferrari 2012; Helsper and Eynon 2013) . How applicable these studies are to the specific literature on i-voting is yet to be fully explored (Carter and Bélanger 2012) . Furthermore, while most of the literature has centered on i-voting in general elections, less is known about its impact in other processes such as referenda and participatory budgeting, where turnout levels are often considerably lower.
Before moving to the next question, it is useful to highlight an important scope condition of our study. The critiques of the introduction of i-voting mechanisms are not limited to the concept of inclusiveness. There are also important debates regarding the quality of online engagement and the security of i-voting. Many refer to online participation as a form of "slacktivism," referring to an activity that, while psychologically rewarding, has little impact on political decisions (Hindman 2009; Morozov 2012; Smith 2013) .
A number of authors also raise questions about the security of i-voting systems (Wolchok et al. 2012; Bélanger and Carter 2011) . The debates on slacktivism and voting security are beyond the scope of this paper. But in the specific case of the State PB, participation in the electronic voting process was quite complex with a multipage ballot that allowed participants to affect not only the allocation of state funds to specific projects, but also more general public policy priorities. Similarly it appears that in Rio Grande do Sul the online vote may be potentially more secure than the face-to-face process, due to the way these two mechanisms are organized. The former is centralized and managed by a unit of the state government that has no stake in the results; the latter is decentralized and managed by volunteers and community leaders who do have a stake in the results of the vote. We will briefly return to this topic in the section describing the voting procedure.
In the next sections, we will first introduce briefly the specifics of the Brazilian case, and then we explain the procedure of i-voting in Rio Grande do Sul's State PB in more detail.
ICT and Participatory Governance Innovations in Brazil
Brazil is an international leader in participatory governance innovations (Fung 2011) . The Federal Constitution of 1988 mandated the introduction of public policy management councils, thematic councils, and management councils (Coelho 2004; Moreira and Escorel 2009) , and introduced an array of democratic decision-making innovations (e.g. referendums, ballot initiatives, civil actions, national citizens conferences). Municipal participatory budgeting (PB) is probably the most famous of these institutions (Wampler 2007; Avritzer 2009; Heller, Baiocchi, and Silva 2011) . The process, initially adopted by 13 cities in Brazil in 1989, has now spread to more than a 1400 cities worldwide (Sintomer et al. 2013) . Recent research has shown that PB processes have direct impacts on reducing mortality rates, promoting health care spending and the creation of civil society organizations (Touchton and Wampler 2013; Gonçalves 2014) .
Participatory budgeting was also scaled up to the state level 8 , including the case we explore in this paper, which is one of the world's largest participatory budgeting processes both in number of participants and geographic coverage. The first instance of a state level PB process occurred in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS) from 1999 to 2002. The experience was continued after the Workers Party (PT)'s loss of the governorship in 2003, with modifications. The new process included Internet voting for the first time and was called Consulta Popular (Goldfrank and Schneider 2006) . After PT's victory in 2010 the process was changed again to its current form, as we shall describe later.
In Brazil, the first experiments in hybridization -including both offline and online venues of participation -began in the late nineties and the early years of the new century when a few cities adopted ICT tools to present proposals to voters or conduct voting in municipal PB processes (e.g., Porto Alegre, Ipatinga). The cities of Belo Horizonte and Recife implemented some of the earliest hybrid programs. The former uses separate online and offline PB processes that decide on the allocation of two different, specific budgets, and the latter integrates online voting into the face-to-face mechanisms (Best et al. 2010) .
A number of cities around the world have adopted the online PB model of Belo Horizonte, without introducing a parallel offline process. This new form of PB is often referred to as e-PB. This process is particularly common in Europe (Nitzsche, Pistoia, and Elsäßer 2012) . Interestingly, in many of these cities the use of ICT was introduced with the more or less explicit objective of attracting younger and more middle class participants. Yet, to date, studies on the use of ICT in PB have been inconclusive in terms of youth and middle class inclusion (Peixoto 2009; Sampaio, Maia, and Marques 2011) . In the case of Rio Grande do Sul's State PB the use of ICT is limited to the final vote of the process, where citizens can choose to cast their vote either offline at ballot stations or via the Internet. The next section describes the process and the voting system.
Multi-channel Participatory Governance in the State of Rio Grande do Sul
After the Workers' Party won the state gubernatorial elections in 2010, it introduced a comprehensive reform of the state level engagement processes (Sistema Estadual de Participação Popular e Cidadã, from now onSistema). With support from the World Bank, Sistema reorganizes and expands a preexisting array of participatory governance mechanisms. While it is too early to understand whether this reform will achieve the ambitious goals of better integration between participatory, deliberative and representative institutions, Sistema has unique characteristics and represents one of the most ambitious projects of state level multi-channel participatory governance in the world. (Oliveira and Karnopp 2013; Goldfrank 2013) .
One component of this system -the State PB -is a participatory governance mechanism that allows citizens and CSOs to influence the allocation of a portion of the state investment budget. This mechanism is an update of the pre-existing Consulta Popular introduced in 2003 (Borowski 2012; Goldfrank 2013 ). There are three changes. First, the new procedure is embedded in the entire system of participa-tory governance, which includes the participatory multi-year plan, a process that defines the state government's major objectives every four years.
Second, the process has a more complex ballot than the previous Consulta Popular, participants can vote on projects and more general policy questions. 9 . Third, the ability of CSO representatives to oversee the implementation of projects has been strengthened. In its current version, the government provides monthly project status reports to the participatory assemblies that manage the process. The detailed mechanisms of the various stages of the State PB are described in the appendix 10 . In what follows we will focus only on the voting process starting with the ballot.
Votes can be cast either in-person or remotely online. The online and the offline ballots are identical. In both processes, the voter is identified by his/her unique federal voter registration number, where each number can only be used once. Voters are not allowed to change their vote. The votes are centrally stored and tallied by the Center for Electronic Government Solutions (PROCERGS), a state government unit specifically created to manage all electronic government infrastructure and processes. The i-voting is monitored by the Regional Councils for Development (COREDES), which are composed of CSOs from their respective regions. 11 The in-person voting process is organized by coordinators who are paid by the state, and by delegates who are selected by the participants of the municipal assemblies as their representatives. 12 The delegates do not receive compensation. On average, there are three to five polling officials at each location. The bylaws of the process specify that if there is a discrepancy of two percent or more between the votes in the ballot boxes and the signatures collected, the particular ballot box is invalidated.
Overall, turnout in the State PB vote is around 15 percent (see Table 1 ) of eligible voters, reaching over one million participants on a yearly basis, making the Rio Grande do Sul PB one of the largest PB processes in the world in terms of number of participants. Most of these voters still vote in person (around 86-88 percent). Concerns about the integrity of the voting process are rarely expressed. However, nothing prevents a participant from voting both online and offline, since the online and offline voter lists are not compared at any point in the process, nor is there any protection against voter coercion in the remote voting. 13 It is important to note that only a few online engagement processes around the world adopt a more ad-9 In the State PB the ballot is divided into three sections. In the first field, the voter can select up to four regional projects from a list of 10-20 projects (see appendix 4 for a sample). In the second field, the voter can select two regional priorities from five possibilities. The voter is also asked to express his/her opinion on a few key policy issues, which constitutes the third field. These three fields on the ballot (cédula) are defined through a series of state, regional and municipal deliberative meetings that involve organized civil society, common citizens and representatives of the state government. 9 While the first field varies from region to region, the other two are identical state-wide. The latter two fields are an innovation introduced in 2011 by the State PB. 10 See appendix 4. 11 The COREDES were introduced in 1994 as a venue to allow civil society organizations to influence development plans for each of the 28 regions of the state. See appendix 4. 12 See appendix 4. 13 Some of the more sophisticated e-voting systems try to minimize the risk of so-called 'over the shoulder attacks' by enabling users to change their vote after they have been cast (e.g. Estonia's electoral i-voting). Identifying solutions for mitigating the risk of multiple-voting and other factors that may distort outcomes is currently one of the activities supported by the World Bank's Digital Engagement Unit.
vanced security system that allows the voter to change their vote to discourage improper influence or use stronger authentication procedures (e.g. Estonia, Switzerland). Most of these strong e-voting security measures | are limited to electoral processes. Furthermore, as the literature on election fraud has shown, electoral integrity continues to be a problem even in offline systems (Hyde 2011; Sjoberg 2012 ).
Methodology & Data
One approach to investigate the issue of turnout and the effect of digital divide on inclusiveness is to observe changes in aggregate-level turnout when i-voting is introduced. However, since electoral dynamics can change significantly from one election (at time t1) to another (t2), it is very difficult to attribute cause and effect with such a research design. The obvious problem is that there is no data on the counterfactual of no i-voting at t2. Thus in this paper we use an indirect approach. First, we identify online-only voters and then we examine the factors that explain the propensity of individuals to identify themselves as online-only voters. We can calculate the overall turnout effect attributable to the introduction of i-voting by using the proportion of self-reported online-only voters. On July 4 2012 we conducted an online survey during the Rio Grande do Sul PB vote. All 124,211 voters who participated in the online vote were invited to complete the survey after they had voted. The survey instrument contained 27 questions, ranging from basic demographic details to participation profile and Internet usage (see appendix 3). A total of 22,300 people took the survey. There was substantial item non-response, meaning that the total sample size for the models in this paper -the number of respondents who gave an answer for each of the variables we use in the online-only voter models -is 18,235 14 . In the following we present the results obtained from the fully completed surveys from RS.
The overall response rate is 18 percent 15 This is a satisfactory 'first contact' response rate for both traditional (e.g. telephone) and online surveys (Cook, Heath, and Thompson 2000 , Yeager et al. 2011 , Pew 2012 . We can analyze the location of each survey response using the respondent's IP-address. 16 There are 6,010 responses from the State capital of Porto Alegre, with substantial numbers of responses from the cities of Pelotas (n=1,251), Caxias do Sul (n=1,122), and Santa Maria (n=1,098). Despite the reasonable response rate, concerns about non-response biases are still present: if respondents are missing at random, this is not a major concern, but it is also possible that there are systematic biases in non-response. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the results of this study are generated using a sample that may not be fully representative of the population of online voters. At the same time, however, we benefit from a very large sample drawn from across the entire state ( Figure 1) , and, we can infer a number of things by analyzing response patterns at the municipal level. For instance, the average response rate at the municipal level is neither correlated with the vote share of the incumbent Governor, nor correlated with turnout in the preceding 2010 elections (see Figure 1 ). This is important since supporters of the new government might have been more inclined to participate in this process. In addition, GDP per capita is positively correlated with the survey response rate, suggesting that richer municipalities are slightly over-represented in the survey data.
In the next section we compare the demographic characteristics of our respondents to the general demographic characteristics of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. We then present general summary statics about the key variables that we employ to the test our hypotheses.
Summary Statistics 17
The majority of the 18,235 survey respondents are female (54.2 percent). This largely corresponds to the gender balance in terms of historical data on participation in traditional participatory budgeting meetings in Porto Alegre. 18 Half of the respondents report they are working, while around a third report that they are studying or teaching. The number of participants that declare themselves unemployed is 7 percent and the proportion of retired respondents is around 5 percent. The unemployment rate in the state of Rio Grande do Sul is 6 percent, suggesting that the survey represents the general population relatively well with respect to employment status. The median age of participants is 31 years and three quarters of the participants are between 25 and 44. The median age in the state is slightly higher around 35 years old. Quite surprisingly, a vast majority of the participants are not very active in the community. More than nine out of ten declare that they had not participated in any discussion regarding the budget before the vote. With regard to Internet usage, more than 97 percent of the participants indicated that they had used the Internet before, but one in five had not used it in the previous three months. In this sense, it seems that i-voting attracts a non-negligible number of people who are traditionally considered as non-Internet users 19 . Slightly more than half of the participants said they were voting from home, while around 40 percent were voting from their place of work. Most importantly, a stunning 63.1 percent of all respondents identified themselves as online-only voters by answering no on the question about whether they would have voted if they had not been able to cast a vote online. 20
Statistical Model and Results
In this section we present the results of the following logistic model:
where π is the probability that individual i self-identifies as an online-only voter, and Xik are common predictors of engagement. The models include dummy variables for each of the regions (COREDES), meaning that we are only looking at variance between individuals within a region rather than explaining regional level variation.
The design of this observational study does not allow us to establish causality, but the hypotheses we introduce have testable predictions (see table 3 ) and we present evidence that is consistent with the hypotheses. We systematically address alternative explanations for the patterns we observe in the unique survey data from the 2012 PB vote. Additional robustness checks are referred to in the text and tables provided in a separate statistical appendix 21 . Previous engagement in traditional and non-traditional forms of politics negatively correlating with self-identification as an online-only voter Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of each of the predictors on being an online-only voter from a multiple logistic regression. A one-unit change in a particular predictor, holding all other predictors at their mean, is on average associated with an effect indicated by the black dot with the 95 percent confidence interval indicated by the blue lines. * Note: Logistic regression with online-only voter as the dependent variable (Question 17, see appendix 3). All other independent variables in the full specification (model 3 in Table 2 , see appendix 2) are held at their mean except for region (COREDES), which is set to be the first region (the results are robust to other region choices). The regression includes regional (COREDES) dummies to account for variation across different settings (ballots etc.). 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
Social media usage has the highest marginal positive effect with an increase of 3.9 percentage points. The reason for this, we hypothesize, is the combination of two factors. Social media users are likely to spend more time on the Internet and have more technological skills (Muñoz and Towner 2011; Hargittai and Litt 2011) . In this respect, a predictor for i-voting would be the degree of Internet usage and skills. 22 Second, given that the Government and a considerable number of i-voters (33.7 percent) share content related to i-voting on social media channels, social media users are more likely to come across content mobilizing users to participate and direct links to the i-voting platform. With regard to socio-economic characteristics, in line with the digital divide literature, and the reinforcement hypothesis, socio-economically privileged individuals are more likely to self-identify as online-only voters according to our analysis. Income and education both have relatively large marginal effects of nearly 2.6 and 2.9 percentage points respectively. Since education is measured on a 10-point scale and income on a 9-point scale, these effects can be substantial when considering the difference between individuals classified as low and high on these measures. Going from one extreme of the education scale to the other translates into a 56.3 percent increase in the probability of being an onlineonly voter (Figure 4) . The equivalent number for the income scale is 38.0 percent. Thus our results are at odds with the empowerment hypothesis, marginalized groups do not appear to benefit from this implementation of i-voting.
With regard to gender inclusiveness, the marginal effect of being male is 2.9 percentage points (Figure 2 ). Yet, combining these regression results with the fact that the majority of survey respondents were female (54.2 percent), offers a more nuanced understanding of the effect of i-voting in terms of gender. Women state that they are less likely to be an online-only voter, but they both vote online as well as fill in the majority of the surveys. Thus, it appears that women might simply engage more frequently both in offline and online processes than men, without necessarily having a preference between the two.
As previously mentioned, the introduction of i-voting in PB processes is motivated by the expectation of attracting young participants. Indeed, there is a substantive relationship between age and ivoting, with 69% of 18 year olds predicted to be online-only voters compared to 56% of 40 year olds, as illustrated in Figure 3 below 23 . These results are in line with theories that emphasizes the role of socialization as one of the main predictors of political participation (Dalton, 2008; Hooghe, 2004; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995) . 22 However, the effects do not change if we include 'active Internet user' as a control for Internet literacy, instead of the social networks question. Being an active Internet user, which is something that 81.4 percent of the respondents classify themselves as, is non-significant with a p-value of .881. 23 Logistic regression with online-only voter as the dependent variable (Question 17, see appendix). All other independent variables, full specification (model 3 in Table 2 see appendix) , are held at their mean except for region (COREDES) which is set to be the first region (the results are robust to other region choices). The regression includes regional (COREDES) dummies to account for variation across different settings (ballots etc.). 95% confidence intervals are displayed (in grey). The findings of this study also support the engagement hypothesis, with online voting boosting the inclusiveness of the process by mobilizing previously inactive citizens. In fact, the largest magnitude effect predicting online-only voting is the large negative effect of having previously attended a participatory budgeting meeting. This reduces a respondent's probability of being an online-only voter by 22 percentage points. The other forms of prior political participation (taking part in community meetings and contacting government) also have large negative marginal effects (10.8 and 6.8 percentage points, respectively) . Findings also indicate that citizens who are already mobilized, i.e., those that take part in physical meetings and that engage with the government, are not greatly affected by the introduction of online voting. In other words, there are no major substitution effects and the introduction of online voting is more likely to increase turnout among previously disengaged citizens. For robustness we tried several different model specifications, but none of these substantively changed the main effects (see appendix 2). In terms of alternative explanations for the observed pattern, one is that the survey may contain measurement error. The dependent variable is a self-reported measure and less privileged groups being more susceptible to a social desirability bias might explain the observed relationship. One hypothesis is that voters with less education and lower incomes could be more reluctant to reveal truth about being an online-only voter. 24 With the current survey instrument we cannot evaluate the social desirability issue. 25 Another challenge with the research design is that the counterfactual of no online voting is a hypothetical scenario in 2012. The reason this is problematic is that the introduction of online voting might have had an effect on the deliberative process building up to the vote, especially considering that the actual vote is the final step in an over three-month-long deliberative process where many stakeholders are actively engaged. Had there been no online voting, the whole campaign surrounding the vote might have looked different, which in turn could have affected voters' attitudes about participation. It is not immediately clear how this could affect the observed results. If organizations involved in voter mobilization put in less effort due to the introduction of online voting, then many people might respond af- 24 As shown in various studies, social desirability biases are not distributed evenly across socioeconomic levels. See, for instance, (Ostapczuk, Musch, and Moshagen 2009), (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012 ). 25 For future research, this could be addressed with a list experiment survey design.
firmatively to the 'online-only voter' question, even if under conditions of an offline-only campaign they might have been mobilized to vote. 26 However, there is no evidence of there being less voter mobilization in 2012.
In general though, social desirability biases and errors usually make respondents claim to be more participatory and engaged than they actually are, with consistently higher numbers claiming to have voted in surveys than actually turned out (Karp and Brockington 2005, 2005; Zeglovits and Kritzinger 2013) . This means that the size of the online-only vote could in reality be even larger than estimated here.
Finally, we assess the overall turnout effect of introducing online technology. In the literature it has been suggested that allowing for Internet voting increases turnout by 0.5-2.6 percent (Trechsel et al. 2007) . 27 Despite the reasonable response rate in the current study, any inferences to the overall population of online voters must be made cautiously. If we ignore a possible non-response bias and consider the sample to be roughly representative of all online voters, we can approximate how many new voters the new voting technology brought in. As almost two-thirds of the survey respondents claim to be online-only voters, the introduction of online voting could be said to have brought in 78,377 new voters, given that the total number of online voters was 124,211. We estimate the total number of voters that would have voted anyway to be 952,941, combining offline voters and online voters who said they would have voted anyway. While bearing in mind the aforementioned caveats to the study, we could consider that the increase in turnout attributable to the introduction of online voting is around 8.2 percent. 28 While we cannot directly observe the attributes of those who did not respond to the survey, it is reasonable to assume that non-respondents are less participatory than respondents on average. This would mean that the calculation of the effect of i-voting on turnout is a conservative estimate, given that online-only voters are less participatory than other online voters, as shown here. Non-response could also be correlated with factors that make online-only voting more likely. Respondents who spend more time on the Internet or have more time free in the day might also be more willing to take an online survey. However, these effects are somewhat less clear. Both variables had a much smaller effect size on online-only voting than the effects of prior participation. All in all, it therefore seems reasonable to believe that the estimate of the overall turnout effect is conservative, while also acknowledging that the estimate has a substantial degree of uncertainty.
Concluding remarks
This paper focused on the effects of remote Internet voting in a budget priority vote in southern Brazil. With regard to the socio-economic profile of participants, we find that youth, male gender, income, education, and social media usage are significant predictors of being online-only voters. We find no substitution effects with the introduction of i-voting. Instead, our findings support the mobilization hypothesis, with i-voting attracting citizens who had no prior experience of contact with the government and who were previously disengaged from the participatory budgeting process. Note that the lack of substitution effect might be an artifact of the pilot stage of the process and the lack of significant mainstream media advertising about the possibility of casting the vote online.
Quite surprisingly, our results strongly support the engagement hypothesis. Previous levels of engagement are the best predictor of participants declaring they would not have voted without an ivoting mechanism. Finally, our model can roughly estimate an 8.2 percent increase in turnout due to the introduction of i-voting. But our model is mainly designed to shed light on the socioeconomics characteristics of internet-only voters. The model is only able to investigate the effect of i-voting on turnout 26 In addition, it is also possible that the presence of an online vote meant that online voters did not take time to find out about the details of an offline vote. However, if there had not been that option, it is possible that some of the online voters would have made the effort to find out where to vote offline. 27 'In 2009 this turnout loss [overall] would have been 2.6 per cent, so it's a small effect on turnout. It's very clear a convenience factor is important', an interview with Trecshel, published at http://www.eui.eu/news/2013/02-12-Internetvotingasuccessintwoeuropeancountries.aspx, accessed April 18 2014. 28 Note that this figure is calculated from the same sample that we use for the models (i.e. only respondents who answered all the questions). If we include the full sample, then the implied turnout increase is 8.1 percent.
indirectly and maintaining a number of assumptions that we cannot test. Thus, our results on the impact of introducing i-voting on turnout should be interpreted cautiously.
When put together these findings raise a number of questions for researchers and policymakers working with i-voting and the use of ICT in citizen engagement processes. From an academic standpoint they offer an interesting contribution to one of the oldest research questions in political science, why do people vote? Our results highlight how both socialization theory and convenience voting approaches alone are not sufficient to explain the socioeconomic characteristics of internet-only voters. Both theories predict the presence of substitution effects, something that we do not find: the majority of our respondents are internet only voters. The age distribution supports the socialization framework, as most of our internet-only voters are young. However socialization theory also predicts the presence of significant reinforcement effects that we do not detect. Most of our participants report that they have not been previously politically engaged and this finding holds even after accounting for age, and is in line with the convenience voting hypothesis. Lowering the cost of participating allows previously disengaged groups to become active in politics.
As mentioned before, the novelty of a pilot process such as this one might have something to do with these results, but only further research can uncover the extent of the impact of such a factor. Overall this study proves the opportunity that the introduction of new technologies of voting and participation offer to enrich debates in political science.
From an institutional design perspective, the fact that many of those becoming involved in the process of online voting are socio-economically privileged people might be a cause for concern, given that traditionally the PB process has strongly emphasized its redistributive justice character (de Sousa Santos 1998; Avritzer 2006) . Nevertheless, much of the PB design that promotes a pro-poor logic precedes the participatory stage (Marquetti, da Silva, and Campbell 2012) , such as the pre-allocation of budgets that prioritize poorer geographic areas and investments that favor poorer sections of society (e.g. water, basic health).
Another issue concerns the effects of i-voting on the attributes of the process in terms of collective intelligence. One rationale for participatory processes is to leverage the dispersed knowledge of citizens to shape decisions that affect them (Ober 2008; Lévy 2001; Peixoto 2013) . In this respect, a growing literature in the fields of epistemic democracy and decision-making suggests that increasing the diversity of participants improves the quality of decisions made, as new cognitive tools, perspectives, heuristics and knowledge are brought together (Ober 2008; Ober 2013; Landemore 2013; Page 2008; Hong and Page 2004; Page 2014) 29 . Thus, a possible hypothesis is that, through the aggregation of inputs from a more diverse group of participants, i-voting may allow for superior choices towards the collective interest. If proven through further research, this could inform the literature on collective intelligence and temper frequent reserves with regard to the use of technology in participatory processes. However, more research is required to assess if younger, but privileged disengaged groups have ideas and arguments that are significantly different from privileged engaged groups. 30 There are several possibilities for future work on this area. It would be useful to conduct additional studies of i-voting in low salience elections in other contexts to discover how generalizable our findings are. Additionally, future work could use multilevel models to examine the role of aggregate factors such as poverty levels or government spending in online only voting and how these interact with the individual level factors we examine in this paper.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the effect of i-voting on the final outcomes of PB is uncertain, both in terms of redistributive impact and collective intelligence. These are essentially empirical questions that can only be addressed by further research. Striking a balance between the ideals of redistributive justice and democratic inclusiveness remains a normative issue to be addressed, ideally, by Rio Grande do Sul citizens themselves. 29 Part of that literature emphasizes a type of collective intelligence that emerges primarily from discursive / deliberative problem solving (Landemore 2013; Hong and Page 2004) , which does not apply to voting processes. Yet, another part that focus on the epistemic properties of judgment aggregation (Ober 2008; Ober 2013; Page 2008; Page 2014; List and Goodin 2001) lends support to a consideration of the potential epistemic character of processes such as that of the State PB voting. 30 In a follow-up randomized controlled trial during the 2014 PB in Rio Grande do Sul it was established that the result of the vote does not change when the composition of voters changes, see Mellon, Peixoto, and Sjoberg 2014 The Citizens' Budget is managed by a commission composed by four representatives of the state government and four representatives of the regional councils of development (COREDES). COREDES were introduced in 1994 as a venue to allow civil society organizations to influence development plans for each of the 28 regions of the state. Each region has its own bylaws (Regimento Interno) that details which organization is eligible to participate in each COREDE.
This statewide commission (Coordenação Estadual da Participação Popular e Cidadã) organizes the meetings, defines the advertising strategy and monitors the implementation of projects. The process is divided in 5 stages and starts officially in March and ends in September. In the first stage 28 public regional assemblies (Audiência Pública Regionais) are organized by each COREDE. These assemblies are public, but most participants are from civil society organizations that are invited by each COREDE.
In these assemblies the state government first presents the overall financial situation of the state, mapping out investments, the amount that has been invested in the region, the guidelines that each sub-branch of the state government has for developing the budget, and the multi-year priorities of the budget. The guidelines for the period 2012-2015 were defined by another participatory engagement process that occurred in 2011 -the multi-year participatory plan (PPA participativo). Then representatives of COREDE present their development plan for the region. Then there are two votes. 1) The participants select the thematic areas and the regional priorities that will affect the typology of projects that can be presented in the participatory budgeting process. 2) The participants vote for three representatives that will enter the Coordenação Regional da Participação Popular e Cidadã. These regional coordination commissions are composed of three representatives of the state government, three representatives of COREDES, and three representatives of the public regional assembly. These meetings are mandated by the law to last at maximum three hours.
From May to June COREDES, in collaboration with its municipal level counterpart -the council for municipal development (Conselho Municipal de Desenvolvimento COMUDES) -organize one assembly in each municipality (497 in 2012). These assemblies are advertised to the public and thus effectively open to all citizens. The minimal quorum for one of these assemblies is 30 participants. In these assemblies the participants propose up to 10 projects within the thematic areas that had been previously selected by the regional assemblies and propose additional regional priorities. These councils also elect delegates, one for every 30 participants. 32 These meetings are mandated by the law to last at maximum two hours and a half.
In the third phase all municipal delegates meet in regional forums (Fóruns Regionais da Partici-paçãoPopular e Cidadã). The regional forums are augmented by the members of COREDES, members of the regional coordination commission and by the regional representatives of the PPA participativo. These assemblies take the input of the previous engagement processes and construct the ballot. More precisely they identify ten projects for the first field of the ballot. These projects have already a specific monetary value. Then they identify five regional priorities. These priorities do not have a monetary value and will compose the second section of the ballot. Then two representatives are elected. These representatives will participate in the Fórum Estadual da Participação Popular e Cidadã (the state level participatory forum). The latter forum contains also representatives of COREDES, of participants in the PPA participativo, the state level coordinating assembly and the state government. The ballot is further revised by the state bureaucracy that eliminates projects that are not feasible.
In the fourth phase the entire population that has an electoral certificate is invited to vote. In 2012 the vote was on the July 4. It lasts one day in the traditional face-to-face format, and three days online.
In the fifth and final phase the Fórum Estadual da Participação Popular e Cidadã uses the results of the vote to define the budget. This forum also continues to monitor the implementation of the projects together with each regional COREDES.
